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Competition, Cost Innovation, and X-
inefficiency in Experimental Markets 
 
Andrew Smyth 
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 
 
Abstract  
This paper examines the relationship between competition, cost innovation, and x-inefficiency in experimental 
markets. In the lab, oligopolists make closer-to-optimal cost innovation expenditures than do monopolists, 
which result in lower x-inefficiency in oligopoly than in monopoly. Oligopolies also increase total surplus relative 
to monopoly, and consumer surplus makes up a larger portion of total surplus in oligopoly than monopoly. The 
data illustrate how x-inefficiency affects surplus dynamically and suggest price as a mechanism by which 
competitive pressure increases cost efficiency. 
Keywords  
X-inefficiency, Cost innovation, Experimental economics 
1 Introduction 
X-inefficiency theory maintains that firms may not minimize their costs of production, especially in markets 
where they experience little competitive pressure.1 To date, there have been no attempts to study x-inefficiency 
using experimental methods.2 While there are always questions of external validity with experimental research, 
the laboratory offers an excellent test bed for x-inefficiency theory because the theory posits a behavioral 
response to external stimuli—an increase in productive efficiency in response to market competition. In the lab, 
competitive stimuli can be precisely applied, and any behavioral response that affects efficiency can be readily 
observed. 
In these experimental markets, subjects participated in a repeated, two-stage game. In the first stage, they 
decided how much to spend on cost innovation. Innovation was stochastic, with their probability of achieving a 
lower production cost increasing in their expenditure. In the second stage, they made pricing and capacity 
decisions given their realized production cost. This second, ‘‘market’’ stage was a monopoly, or a duopoly, or a 
quadopoly. 
X-inefficiency theory typically assumes that the cost frontier is achievable—if management makes necessary 
expenditures. In these experiments, as in actual markets, cost innovation was stochastic. Chance dictated that 
subjects could not always achieve the exogenous cost frontier, so x-inefficiencies are measured relative to 
optimal innovation paths that are calculated for each market structure. 
The data show that subjects in more competitive market structures attempted closer-to-optimal cost 
innovation. They support the hypothesis that competitive pressure reduces x-inefficiency relative to monopoly. 
More competitive market structures also increased total surplus and the percentage of total surplus that is 
consumer surplus, relative to monopoly. Finally, the experiments illustrate how x-inefficiency affects surplus 
dynamically. 
Outside the lab, competitive pressure may limit opportunities for afternoon tee times, opulent office decor, or 
for using obsolete production methods. In these experiments, differential pricing pressure alone created 
differences in cost efficiency for monopolies relative to more competitive markets. Thus, the data highlight price 
as a mechanism through which competitive pressure curbs x-inefficiency. 
2 The Experiments 
2.1 Motivation 
Though no experimental study can incorporate all of the nuance of naturally-occurring markets, the hypothesis 
that competition reduces x-inefficiency is general, and so if valid, should hold in stylized experimental markets 
(Plott 1989). Relative to studies that employ naturally-occurring data, the laboratory is a fruitful venue for 
examining the relationship between competition and cost efficiency. Because demand and costs are known, the 
primary variables of interest do not have to be estimated. Furthermore, the experimental markets are 
exogenously switched from monopoly to oligopoly (and vice versa), which allow for clean causal inference of the 
effect of competition on cost efficiency. 
The experimental literature on cost innovation is modest (see for example, Isaac and Reynolds 1992; Darai et al. 
2010; Sacco and Schmutzler 2011; Aghion et al. 2014). My design is similar to Isaac and Reynolds (1992), but 
with several key differences: Isaac and Reynolds employ a repeated, two-stage game to examine competition in 
both cost innovation and price. They seek an experimental ‘‘existence proof’’ of innovation competition akin to 
that described by Joseph Schumpeter, and report more aggregate expenditure on cost innovation in quadopoly 
than monopoly. 
Isaac and Reynolds’s experimental firms have non-constant marginal costs; here, marginal costs are constant. X-
inefficiency theory does not depend on this heroic assumption, but the functional form ensures that suboptimal 
capacity and x-inefficiency are not conflated. There are different capacity constraints across treatments in Isaac 
and Reynolds (10 units in their monopolies; 5 units in their quadopolies). Here, all firms have a maximum 
capacity of 8 units regardless of market size, which allows for clean comparisons across treatments. In Isaac and 
Reynolds, there are 10 market periods with cost innovation; in these experiments, there are 30 such periods. 
Finally, and most important, Isaac and Reynolds vary competition between-subjects. Here, competition is varied 
both between and within subjects. The within-subject variation is motivated by Leibenstein (1966), who gives 
examples of x-inefficiencies increasing in firms after the departure of management consultants. He implies that 
successful consultants limit x-inefficiency, but that x-inefficiency rises once they depart. In one set of 
treatments, subjects are exogenously switched from monopoly to oligopoly to monopoly, to see if the pattern of 
x-inefficiency tracks the pattern in Leibenstein’s anecdote. 
2.2 Design 
These experiments examine cost efficiency across several market structures. The experimental subjects acted as 
firm managers. Each period, for a number of periods, they made cost innovation expenditure decisions. Then, 
given realized costs of production, they selected prices and capacities. Finally, sales of a homogeneous product 
were allocated according to a rationing rule. The key experimental parameters are presented in Table 1 and are 
discussed below. 
Table 1 Key parameter values 
Parameter Value 
Endowment $5.00 
Attempts [0, 30] 
Cost per attempt $0.10 
Prob(Innovation | 1 Attempt) 10 % 
Prob(Innovation | a Attempts) 1 -.90a 
Initial production cost $7.75 
Innovation lowered cost by $0.25 
Price [c, $20.00] 
Production (sales) capacity 8 
All prices and costs are in experimental dollars. Attempts and capacity choices are integers. Endowments were 
awarded and initial costs reset at the beginning of each block 
The experiments lasted 30 periods. Each period was divided into two stages: an Innovation stage and a Market 
stage. In Innovations stages, subjects decided how many ‘‘innovation processes’’ (hereafter, ‘‘attempts’’) to 
purchase. They knew that they would subsequently be sellers in a market, and that if one of their purchased 
attempts was successful, their costs of producing units in the market would be reduced. But they also knew that 
attempts were costly, and that success was randomly determined. After deciding how many attempts to buy, 
subjects learned whether they were successful in lowering their production costs. Then they entered the Market 
stage and selected a price and a capacity. Finally, they learned their market sales and profit. 
Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to a market and remained in that market 
for the entire experiment. The 30 periods were divided into three 10-period blocks. At the beginning of each 
block, subjects were endowed with $5.00 experimental dollars.3 In each Innovation stage, subjects could 
purchase a (0 ≤ a ≤ 30) attempts. Each attempt cost $0.10 and carried a 10 % chance of success. If a subject was 
successful, her marginal cost of producing units in the current and all future periods in the same block was 
lowered by $0.25 per unit. Each cost reduction was 3 % of the marginal cost that the subjects faced at the start 
of a block. 
Subjects could receive at most one cost reduction per period and could purchase at most 30 attempts during 
each Innovation stage (i.e., at the early part of each period).4 Innovation expenditures were sunk; all a attempts 
were paid for regardless of whether all were necessary to achieve the cost reduction ex post. The probability of 
achieving the cost reduction was an increasing function of expenditure: θ(a) = 1 – 0.90a. Innovation success 
meant lower costs for the innovating seller only (there were no spillovers). 
Following the Innovation stage, subjects participated as sellers in a posted-price market (the Market stage). 
Posted-price markets are analogous to many retail markets in that there is no haggling. All sellers produced a 
homogeneous product. Prior to period 1 of each block, they shared a constant cost function of $7.75. In 
subsequent periods of the block, their cost functions differed (in level) depending on their various successes or 
failures in the preceding Innovation stages. Between blocks, all sellers’ cost functions reset to $7.75. Costs only 
applied to units sold: The product was ‘‘made to order.’’ 
The exogenous cost frontier for each period was the same in all treatments. This frontier was achieved if a 
subject successfully innovated each period—it was $7.50 in period 1, $7.25 in period 2, etc. Because it was 
unlikely that subjects would successfully innovate each and every period, the results in Sect. 2.4 focus on 
deviations from optimal innovation paths (explained in Sect. 2.3). 
In each Market stage, sellers entered a price and a integer production capacity between 0 and 8 units. They 
could not price discriminate; their posted price applied to all units that they might sell. All sellers, regardless of 
treatment, shared the exogenous capacity-constraint of 8 units. While subjects could endogenously constrain 
their output further, it was a weakly dominant strategy always to choose a capacity of 8 units.5 
The demand side of the market was automated. Subjects were not told the reservation prices of the ‘‘robot’’ 
buyers.6 Each buyer had a unique reservation price. The highest was $10.01, with each successive buyer’s 
reservation price $0.25 lower in value (i.e., $9.76, $9.51, $9.26,...), giving demand a stairstep shape as in Fig. 1. 
The queue was not random. Buyers purchased in descending order of their reservation price. 
 
Fig. 1 Experimental market structure 
 
There were monopoly, duopoly, and quadopoly markets. In monopolies, buyers bought one unit from a seller, 
provided that the seller’s posted price was less than the buyer’s reservation price. Monopolists were assured of 
selling 8 units, provided that they posted a price of $8.26 or less. In duopolies and quadopolies, sellers competed 
for sales. The seller who posted the lowest price got to make sales first. She took the highest reservation price 
buyers out of the market. After the lowest price seller made her sales (up to 8), the next lowest price seller had 
an opportunity to make sales. In the event of a price tie, units were randomly allocated among the price-tied 
sellers. Thus, in the oligopolies, units of the homogeneous product potentially sold for different prices in the 
same market. 
Table 2 summarizes the design, where n denotes the maximum market size. The ONE treatment was a monopoly 
baseline. In the TWO and FOUR treatments, subjects were monopolists in Block 1, and thereafter faced 
competition. In the TWOREV and FOURREV treatments, subjects shared a design history with the TWO and 
FOUR treatments through the completion of Block 2. Between Blocks 2 and 3, the subjects in these -REV (short 
for reversion) treatments were exogenously switched back to monopoly. 
Table 2 Experimental design 
Treatment Sellers (n) Periods   
  1–10 11–20 21–30 
ONE 1 Monopoly Monopoly Monopoly 
TWO 2 Monopoly Duopoly Duopoly 
TWOREV 2 Monopoly Duopoly Monopoly 
FOUR 4 Monopoly Quadopoly Quadopoly 
FOURREV 4 Monopoly Quadopoly Monopoly 
 
The reversion treatments were inspired by Leibenstein (1966). Their market structure pattern across blocks offer 
the absence (Monopoly), presence (Oligopoly), and absence (Monopoly) of pricing pressure that may cause a 
pattern of cost reductions that mimic the absence, presence, and eventual absence again of management 
consultants who, when present, help implement cost reductions.7 
Subjects were monopolists in all treatments in Block 1. This established an almost constant baseline of 
experience. I say ‘‘almost constant’’ because when subjects in the n>1 treatments were monopolists, they 
received information after each period about the decisions of the other seller(s) in their market. This feedback 
was their market companions’ innovation attempts, innovation outcomes (success or failure), posted prices, and 
sales. Subjects in ONE only received feedback about their own decisions and outcomes.8 
The difference between the monopoly and oligopoly market structures was explained to the subjects in non-
technical and context-free language. Subjects in the n>1 treatments knew that they were in a market with 
another (or three other) subject(s). They knew that market structure was fixed throughout a block, but could 
vary across blocks. The instructions were explicit that they would not be informed as to which market structure 
they faced in a given block. Thus, in each of the three blocks, subjects had to learn whether they faced 
competition for sales (oligopoly) or not (monopoly).9 See the ‘‘Appendix’’ for the instructions. 
2.3 Measurement and Optimal Innovation 
An advantage of experimental data vis-a´-vis naturally-occurring data is that all of the variables of interest are 
precisely measurable. Figure 1 illustrates the experimental market structure. Let p and q denote the market 
price and quantity. Actual costs of production are cA and the cost frontier is cF. Maximum total surplus is the 
area AcFF. Actual total surplus is the area AcADB, which can be divided into consumer surplus (ApB) and producer 
surplus (pcADB). 
Unfortunately, x-inefficiency has been used casually in the literature to reference both a distance and an area. I 
follow Leibenstein (1978) and define x-inefficiency as a distance, or, ‘‘the excess of actual over minimum cost for 
a given output.’’ In Fig. 1, x-inefficiency is the distance cA - cF. The surplus loss from x-inefficiency is an area; it is 
a function of both x-inefficiency and output. In Fig. 1, it is the shaded area cAcFED.10 
In monopoly markets, an optimal pure strategy in price and capacity, {p*(c), q*}, exists. As the notation suggests, 
this optimal price is a function of the cost level. On the other hand, no pure strategy equilibria in price and 
capacity exist for the oligopoly markets. Consequently, I use ex post empirical profits to solve for optimal 
innovation paths instead of ex ante theoretical profits. Because cost reductions carry over from period-to-
period, I generate these paths from a finite-horizon, dynamic optimization problem. For period t, the problem is: 
max
𝑎𝑡
{𝜃(𝑎𝑡)[𝜋𝑗(𝑠𝑡 − 0.25) + 𝑉(𝑠𝑡 − 0.25)] + [1 − 𝜃(𝑎𝑡)][𝜋𝑗(𝑠𝑡) + 𝑉(𝑠𝑡)] − 𝑐𝑎𝑡}. 
(1) 
The state variable, 𝑠𝑡, is the initial cost level in period t before any innovation attempts are purchased. The 
choice variable is the number of attempts, 𝑎𝑡. Let c be the cost of 1 attempt; let, 𝜃(𝑎)  =  1 –  0.90
a be the 
probability that an innovation is successful when 𝑎𝑡 attempts are purchased; and let 𝑉(.) be the continuation 
value. Finally, 𝜋𝑗 (.) is the observed, average profit for a given block, cost level, and market structure.
11 
The solution to (1) answers the question, ‘‘If I know what average Market stage profit will be, how many 
attempts should I purchase at the Innovation stage?’’ Table 3 lists the optimal innovation paths for each (Block 
3) period and market structure—including an optimal path calculated with theoretical monopoly profit. The 
paths reveal that optimal innovation decreases in time, because earlier cost reductions are more profitable. 
Monopoly subjects should attempt the most innovation, followed by duopoly and quadopoly subjects. This is 
because oligopoly price competition can whittle away the gains from innovation that exist under monopoly (and, 
in the experimental set-up, volume for a seller—whether monopolist or oligopolist—was limited to eight units). 
Whether monopoly, duopoly, or quadopoly was the most cost-efficient market structure depended on the 
decisions of the incentivized subjects. The next section analyses their data. 
Table 3 Optimal innovation paths 
Period Monopoly (Theory) Monopoly (Block 3) Duopoly (Block 3) Quadopoly (Block 3) 
1 28.0 28.0 22.0 21.0 
2 27.0 27.0 21.5 19.0 
3 25.7 26.0 20.0 17.3 
4 24.5 24.8 16.5 15.0 
5 23.2 23.2 15.0 13.4 
6 21.2 21.7 14.0 11.5 
7 19.0 19.3 12.1 9.7 
8 16.5 16.5 10.1 7.5 
9 12.4 13.0 6.4 6.2 
10 5.8 5.7 2.4 2.5 
The numbers in the table are optimal attempts. The profit measure used in optimization (theoretical or average 
profit) is in parenthesis 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Preliminaries 
The experiments were conducted at a large, public research university in the United States. Subjects were 
recruited using the ORSEE recruitment system, and the experiment was executed in z-Tree (Greiner 2015; 
Fischbacher 2007). Subjects received US$10.00 for arriving at the computer lab on time. See Table 4 for mean 
earnings by treatment. All treatments lasted approximately two hours. 
In the figures in this Data section, I pool the monopoly market data across treatments for Blocks 1 and 3.12 I first 
present the time paths of market price and quantity to provide a picture of Market stage competition. Then I 
establish that oligopoly subjects attempted closer-to-optimal cost innovation than did their monopoly 
counterparts. In fact, oligopolists attempted significantly more innovation than did monopolists in Block 3 and 
were no ‘‘luckier’’ in achieving cost reductions. 
Table 4 Key statistics 
 ONE TWO TWOREV FOUR FOURREV 
Subjects 12 16 18 12 16 
Markets 12 8 9 3 4 
Mean earningsa $36.01 $23.11 $26.99 $19.77 $24.23 
Actual innovation success rateb      
Block 1 (%) 13 11 11 9 9 
Block 2 (%) 10 10 10 10 10 
Block 3 (%) 10 11 11 10 10 
a Includes a US$10.00 show-up fee. All amounts in this row are for US$ 
b The parameterized stochastic success rate was 10 % per try 
Using regression analysis, I show that oligopoly markets were significantly less x-inefficient than were monopoly 
markets. Finally, I report surplus comparisons across the market structures. 
2.4.2 Results 
Figure 2 graphs both share-weighted market price and average market quantity over time. In a given period, 
share-weighted market price is 
1
𝑀
∑  ∑  
𝑛𝑚
𝑖=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑠𝑖𝑚 ⋅ 𝑃𝑖𝑚. 
(2) 
where 𝑚 indexes markets and 𝑖 indexes firms within market m, where 𝑛𝑚 𝜖 {1, 2, 4}. Also, s_im is firm i’s market 
share, and 𝑃𝑖𝑚 is that firm’s price. Average market quantity is calculated as market quantity, averaged across all 
monopoly, duopoly, and quadopoly markets. 
A cost-efficient, profit-maximizing monopolist lowers her price over the course of a block as she achieves cost 
reductions. Figure 2 shows that actual monopoly subjects posted relatively constant prices. In Block 3, the 
monopoly price path even trends up over the first several periods. This reflects the fact that -REV subjects 
realized they were monopolists in Block 3 and raised their prices accordingly. 
 
Fig. 2 Price and market quantity over time 
 
Prices in the duopoly and quadopoly markets were markedly lower than prices in the monopolies. Moreover, 
the quadopolies had lower prices than the duopolies. To provide a clearer picture of pricing in the quadopolies, 
share-weighted marginal cost is graphed for these markets. A comparison of these cost data to the price path 
reveals that price roughly tracked cost. The market quantity data are very similar to the price data, only in 
inverse. 
I now turn to cost innovation and the first result. 
Result 1 Competition reduced the difference between actual and optimal innovation relative to monopoly. 
Support For each block and market structure, optimal innovation paths were calculated as described in Sect. 
2.3.13 Figure 3 shows the deviations in actual attempts from these optimal paths. Subjects under-invested in 
innovation relative to the optimal path where the series are below 0; where they are above 0, they 
overinvested. 
 Fig. 3 Optimal innovation path deviations 
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests were conducted for the null hypothesis that the deviation paths from different market 
structures are from populations with the same distribution.14 In Block 2, the duopoly [quadopoly] deviation path 
is significantly different from the monopoly path (𝑝 =  0: 01 [𝑝 =  0: 08]). The deviation paths for the two 
oligopolies are not significantly different (𝑝 =  0: 33). In Block 3, the duopoly [quadopoly] deviation path is also 
significantly different from the monopoly path (𝑝 =  0: 01 [𝑝 =  0: 01]). Likewise, the duopoly and quadopoly 
paths are not significantly different from one another (𝑝 =  0: 82). 
Subjects in all blocks and all market structures under-invested in cost innovation.15 This general under-
investment does not tarnish the result that subjects in more competitive market structures made closer-to-
optimal innovation decisions. The optimal innovation problem here is complex enough to require time, 
knowledge, and computing power to solve precisely. It is suggested in the Conclusion that in complex 
environments, competitive prices can better direct firms toward optimal innovation than can monopoly prices. 
As the next result shows, oligopolists in Block 3 not only attempted closer-to-optimal innovation than did 
monopolists, they even attempted more innovation. 
Result 2 Competition increased expenditure on cost innovation relative to monopoly. 
Support The top panel of Fig. 4 shows average attempts over time. This is calculated as the average number of 
innovation attempts purchased by a subject in a market, averaged across all monopoly, duopoly, and quadopoly 
markets. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates are presented in Table 5. The second and third 
columns report specifications with attempts as the dependent variable; one estimated with Block 2 data and 
another with Block 3 data. The variable Period is a linear time trend, and Duopoly and Quadopoly are indicator 
variables for the market structure. There are fewer than 740 observations (74 subjects x 10 periods) because 
only non-zero market share data were used in estimation. The coefficient estimates should be interpreted 
relative to data from the monopoly markets. 
 
Fig. 4 Innovation attempts and x-inefficiency over time 
 
The regressions indicate no treatment effect in Block 2, as no coefficient estimates are significantly different 
from zero (save for that on the constant). For Block 3, they suggest that competitive pressure initially increased 
the amount of attempted cost innovation. The intercept estimates for the duopoly and quadopoly markets are 
both significant and positive in sign. Note that the slope estimate (x Period) is not significant for the duopoly 
markets, but is both significant and negative in sign for the quadopoly markets. Thus, in the duopoly markets, 
the treatment effect persisted over time; in the quadopoly markets, it dissipated. The regressions confirm the 
visuals in Fig. 4 and indicate that in addition to being closer to the optimal innovation path, oligopolists actually 
attempted more innovation than did monopolists in Block 3. 
It is important to establish that oligopoly subjects did not achieve more innovation success than did monopoly 
subjects by chance, or vice versa. The empirical innovation success rates are given in Table 4. Recall that the 
parameterized stochastic success rate was 10 % per try. Note that in Blocks 2 and 3, no treatments are outliers 
in terms of their actual success rate. Thus, subjects in the oligopoly markets were no ‘‘luckier’’ in achieving cost 
reductions than their monopoly counterparts. 
In Block 3, attempted cost innovation in quadopoly started above monopoly, but finished below. For the whole 
block, there was little difference in average attempts between the quadopoly and monopoly markets (6.65 
versus 6.49). However, the aggregate innovation data conceal important firm dynamics. Figure 5 is the Block 3 
attempts graph from Fig. 4, with the quadopoly time series disaggregated. Specifically, the quadopoly series is 
broken up into a time path for quadopolists with a market share above 0.5, and another for those quadopolists 
with a market share below 0.5. 
Figure 5 reveals that quadopoly subjects’ innovation expenditures were heterogeneous. Subjects with little or no 
market share curtailed their innovation expenditures relative to monopolists, and so drove down average 
attempts in the latter periods of Block 3. On the other hand, large market share subjects invested in more cost 
innovation than did monopolists until the final two periods of Block 3. 
 
Fig. 5 Innovation attempts in Block 3 
 
The preceding analysis can be summarized: In Blocks 2 and 3, subjects in the more competitive market 
structures made closer-to-optimal innovation expenditures. In Block 3, duopolists and high-market-share 
quadopolists actually attempted significantly more innovation than did monopolists. Finally, oligopoly subjects 
were no ‘‘luckier’’ in achieving cost innovations than were their monopolist counterparts. 
I now examine whether the significant difference in cost innovation translated into a significant difference in x-
inefficiency. 
Result 3 Competition reduced x-inefficiency relative to monopoly. 
Support X-inefficiencies are calculated relative to the optimal innovation paths, {𝑎 ∗1 ;  . . . ;  𝑎 ∗10}. For each 
period and each market structure, the probability of achieving a cost reduction is 𝜃(𝑎𝑡
∗)  =  1 −  .90𝑎𝑡
∗. The cost 
frontier in period t relative to the optimal path is calculated according to 𝐶𝐹𝑡  =  7.75 − ∑𝑡  0.25 𝜃(𝑎𝑡
∗). 
The bottom panel of Fig. 4 shows share-weighted x-inefficiency over time. The time series are presented relative 
to x-inefficiency in the monopoly markets, so the monopoly time paths are all horizontal at 0.0. X-inefficiency is 
strikingly lower in the duopoly and quadopoly markets relative to the monopoly markets. 
Table 5 contains regression results for x-inefficiency. The coefficient estimates should be interpreted relative to 
data from the monopoly markets. The results are consistent with Fig. 4. The estimates of the interaction term 
coefficients ( x Period) are significant and negative in sign for both blocks. In Blocks 2 and 3, x-inefficiency fell by 
roughly 0.07 each duopoly period relative to monopoly. The estimates also suggest that x-inefficiency fell by 
0.05 (0.11) in quadopoly relative to monopoly each Block 2 (Block 3) period.16 
Table 5 OLS estimates for attempts and x-inefficiency 
Dependent variable Attempts  X-inefficiency  
Block 2 3 2 3 
Constant 8.648*** 8.130***   
 (1.830) (0.781)   
Period -0.266 -0.285*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 
 (0.231) (0.058) (0.020) (0.011) 
Duopoly -0.930 3.340* 0.134*** 0.039 
 (2.063) (1.821) (0.026) (0.054) 
Duopoly x period 0.132 -0.227 -0.069*** -0.066*** 
 (0.246) (0.163) (0.024) (0.018) 
Quadopoly -0.463 5.359** 0.094* 0.016 
 (2.189) (2.293) (0.051) (0.073) 
Quadopoly x period -0.029 -0.625** -0.054** -0.111*** 
 (0.265) (0.283) (0.023) (0.016) 
Observations 541 650 541 650 
R2 0.02 0.08 0.57 0.64 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by market). Only non-zero market share data was used in estimation. 
Significant at the 1 % (***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level 
In sum, the analysis suggests that duopoly and quadopoly subjects generated significantly less x-inefficiency 
than did monopoly subjects. Moreover, quadopolies had less x-inefficiency than did duopolies in Block 3. 
Surplus data are considered next. 
Result 4 Competition increased total surplus relative to monopoly. 
Support The top panel of Fig. 6 shows the time path of (actual) total surplus, averaged across all monopoly, 
duopoly, and quadopoly markets. Table 6 shows regression results for total surplus. The regressions confirm the 
visuals in Fig. 6. Oligopoly markets generated statistically significantly more surplus than the did monopolies in 
Blocks 2 and 3. 
 
Fig. 6 Surplus and percent consumer surplus over time 
 
The bottom panel of Fig. 6 shows the time path of the percent of total surplus that was consumer surplus. In 
terms of Fig. 1, it is the ratio of ApB to AcADB. The duopoly and quadopoly markets had a greater percentage of 
consumer surplus than the did monopolies, though the empirical percentage fell below 100 %. Across all three 
blocks, consumer surplus averaged 68 % of total surplus in oligopoly compared to 45 % in monopoly. 
Table 6 OLS estimates for total surplus 
Dependent variable Total surplus  
Block 2 3 
Constant 9.328*** 10.366*** 
 (0.489) (0.351) 
Period 0.872*** 0.627*** 
 (0.197) (0.116) 
Duopoly 0.757 1.499* 
 (0.684) (0.800) 
Duopoly x period 0.661** 0.866*** 
 (0.278) (0.202) 
Quadopoly 0.870 1.541 
 (0.938) (1.015) 
Quadopoly x period 0.832*** 1.503*** 
 (0.257) (0.158) 
Observations 541 650 
R2 0.60 0.55 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses (by market). Only non-zero market share data was used in estimation. 
Significant at the 1 % (***), 5 % (**), and 10 % (*) level 
3 Conclusion 
X-inefficiency exists in these experimental markets, and competition reduces it relative to monopoly. What is it 
about competitive pressure that spurs cost efficiency? The experiments suggest price as an answer. There has 
been much written on how the information contained in prices enables the efficient allocation of output. Prices 
also convey information that motivates the efficient production of output. Price competition grabs sellers’ 
attention and signals firms that they must keep their costs minimized or else lose market share. 
The experiments illustrate price competition as a mechanism that promotes cost efficiency. Subjects in the 
FOUR and FOURREV treatments came from the same student population, received identical instructions, 
interacted with uniform experimental software, and confronted the same experimental design prior to Block 3. 
But in that block, FOUR sellers competed with one another for sales while FOURREV sellers were monopolists. 
The difference in outcomes is stark. 
Figure 7 shows the Block 3 time paths for share-weighted price and share-weighted marginal cost. In FOUR, 
prices fell across time; in FOURREV, they rose. Falling prices in FOUR pushed sellers to reduce their costs or have 
zero market share. There was no such pricing pressure to spur sellers to cost-innovate in FOURREV. Notice that 
FOURREV costs were approximately at the level of FOUR prices. 
 
Fig. 7 Comparison of FOUR and FOURREV 
 
Some critics of x-inefficiency theory argue that surplus losses from x-inefficiency are identical to surplus gains 
from producer leisure.17 Even if one does not equate surplus losses from x-inefficiency with surplus gains from a 
‘‘quiet life,’’ x-inefficiency may not be thought important because it does not diminish consumer surplus; it only 
‘‘eats’’ into producer surplus. However, this is only true from a static perspective. 
The experiments show how x-inefficiency affects surplus dynamically. Subjects used cost innovation differently 
in monopoly and oligopoly. In oligopoly, they had to cost-innovate to keep market share—the most x-efficient 
seller in each quadopoly (duopoly) had the largest market share 70 % (81 %) of the time. As they drove their 
costs down over time, more buyers were brought into the market, thus increasing total surplus. Because market 
price tracked the downward trajectory of costs, consumer surplus continued to be a substantial percentage of 
total surplus in the oligopoly markets. On the other hand, monopolists kept their prices relatively constant and 
used cost innovation to widen their profit margins. As a result, consumer surplus as a percentage of total surplus 
fell over time in monopoly. 
This research is the first to test experimentally the hypothesis that competitive pressure reduces x-inefficiency. 
Data generated from the interaction of incentivized human subjects in laboratory markets strongly support the 
hypothesis. The experiments vividly demonstrate the ills of x-inefficiency, but also the power of competition to 
spur cost efficiency and lower prices and to promote surplus. 
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Appendix 
Note: these are the instructions from FOUR and FOURREV. To maintain neutral language, the monopoly market 
structure was referred to as ‘multiple’ and quadopoly was referred to as ‘single’. 
Instructions 
This is an experiment on economic decision making. 
Please turn off and stow all electronic devices (cell phones, computers, tablets, etc.). 
Also, please do not communicate with other subjects from now until the end of today’s experiment. 
If you have a question at any point during these instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand 
and an experimenter will come to your terminal to address your question privately. 
For participating in today’s experiment you will receive a show-up fee of $10 plus the amount you earn during 
the course of the experiment. During the experiment, your earnings (excluding show-up fee) will be designated 
in experimental dollars ($). At the conclusion of the experiment, experimental dollars will be converted into U.S. 
dollars (US$) at an exchange rate of $10.00 to US$1.00. 
Example: If you earn $80.00 during the experiment, you will be paid US$8.00 at the conclusion of the 
experiment. 
You cannot leave today with less than your US$10.00 show-up fee. 
This experiment is composed of 3 blocks. 
Each block is divided into 10 periods and each period is further sub-divided into 2 stages. 
In other words, this experiment consists of 3 blocks, 10 periods and 60 stages total. At any point during the 
experiment you can determine the block number, period number, and stage by examining the top of your 
computer screen. 
In each period, you will first participate in an Innovation stage and then in a Market stage. We will discuss the 
Market stage first. 
Market Stage 
In each Market stage, you will have the opportunity to sell units of a good. 
You will have a production cost per unit, or an amount it costs you to produce a single unit. This production cost 
per unit is constant regardless of how many units you produce. 
Example: Say your production cost per unit is $7.75. Then your first unit costs you $7.75 to produce, your second 
also costs you $7.75, and so on. If you produce 5 units and your production cost per unit is $7.75, your total 
production cost is $38.75 (since 5 times 7.75 equals 38.75). 
In each Market stage, you will decide the maximum number of units you wish to sell in the current Market 
stage. You may choose to sell 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 units. 
Choosing, say, 7 units as your maximum quantity to sell does not guarantee that you will sell 7 units. The process 
that determines how many units you actually sell is described later. 
If you select 7 as your maximum number to sell but you only sell 3 units your total production cost will be for 3 
and not 7 units. Think of units as being ‘‘made to order.’’ You choose the maximum number of units you are 
willing to sell, but you only produce the number of units you end up selling. 
In addition to submitting a maximum number of units to sell, you will also submit a price. This price is the price 
that you are willing to sell all of your units for. You cannot sell different units for different prices. Prices can be 
any two decimal number from your cost of producing units to $20.00. The computer will not let you sell units at 
a loss. 
Example: Say you select a maximum number of units to sell of 2 and a price of $8.00. If you end up 
selling both units you will sell them each for $8.00. 
You are in a market with three other sellers. They are currently reading the same instructions you are and will be 
confronting the same decisions that you will. They will also be selecting a maximum number of units to sell and a 
price in each Market stage. 
What determines how many units you sell? Once you and the other sellers have entered prices, all of your 
prices will be publicly displayed. You will see the prices they chose and they will see the price you chose. 
However, you will not know what maximum quantity they selected and they will not know what maximum 
quantity you selected. 
The buyers in this experiment are computerized. Each buyer has some $ value for 1 unit. We refer to this value 
as their buyer value. 
If you post a price that is lower than the prices posted by all the other sellers in your market, buyers will ‘‘line 
up’’ to purchase from you first. They will line up in descending order of their buyer value. In other words, the 
buyer with the highest buyer value will be ‘‘at the front of the line’’ and the buyer with the lowest buyer value 
will be at the back of the line. 
Remember: You cannot sell more units than the maximum number of units you select! 
Example: Say there are 2 buyers: Buyer 1 with a buyer value of $10.00 and Buyer 2 with a buyer value of 
$5.00. If you post a price of $8.00 and the other sellers post a price of $9.00, the buyers come to you 
first since your price is the lowest. Buyer 1 values a unit at $10.00 and you are selling units at $8.00, so 
Buyer 1 is willing to purchase 1 unit from you. Buyer 2 is next in line, but since he only values units at 
$5.00, he does not buy a unit from you. 
Example: Say there are buyers with buyer values of $10.00, $9.00, and $8.00. Say you post a price of 
$7.80 and a maximum quantity of 2. Suppose that the other sellers in your market post prices of $7.95, 
$8.00 and $8.10. Since you have the lowest price, the buyers come to you first. All three buyers would 
like to buy a unit each from you since your price is lower than each of their buyer values. However, only 
the buyers with buyer values of $10.00 and $9.00 are able to buy from you since you set your maximum 
quantity to 2. 
If you post a higher price than another seller in your market, you must wait until they have sold their maximum 
quantity. If they have sold their maximum quantity and there are still buyers who wish to buy at your price, 
these buyers will buy from you. 
If you and another seller in your market post identical prices, the computer determines the number of buyers 
who wish to buy units at your common price. If there are ‘‘extra’’ units that cannot be divided evenly among the 
sellers who submitted the same price, the ‘‘extra’’ unit(s) is (are) randomly awarded by the computer. 
Example: Say you and another seller both post a price of $8.25 and that 7 buyers are willing to buy units 
at that price. You and the other seller each sell 3 units and the 7th or ‘‘extra’’ unit is randomly assigned 
to either you or the other seller. You and the other seller each have a 50/50 chance of selling the extra 
unit. 
Summary of How Units Are Sold 
If your price is lower: 
You sell until you have sold your maximum quantity, or 
You sell until your price is greater than any remaining buyer’s buyer value 
If your price is higher: 
You wait until any other sellers (with lower prices) have sold their maximum quantity, then the process is the 
same as above 
If your price is the same: 
The computer calculates the number of buyers who wish to buy at your common price. If there are ‘‘extra’’ units 
that cannot be divided evenly among the sellers who submitted the same price, the computer will randomly 
determine how to allocate the extra units. 
You can never sell more units than the maximum number of units you select! 
Innovation Stage 
You and the other sellers in your market will begin each block with the same production cost per unit: $7.75 per 
unit. However, in the Innovation stage you and the other sellers will each independently make choices which 
may allow your own production costs to be reduced. Your choices in the Innovation stage can only influence 
your own production costs and not those of the other sellers, and vice versa. 
Your costs will be influenced by a random process. This process involves ten numbers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 
10. Each of these numbers is equally likely to be selected by the process. In other words, the probability of any 
one number, say 6, being selected by the process is 1/10 or 10 %. 
The process just described has two outcomes: success and failure. Success occurs when the process selects the 
number 10; failure occurs when the process selects any number other than 10 (numbers 1–9). Since the 
probability that the process will select the number 10 is 1/10 or 10 %, the probability that the process results in 
success is 1/10 or 10 %. 
If the process is a success, your costs of producing units in the current and all future periods within a block will 
be reduced by $0.25. 
Example: If you are successful in the Innovation stage of block 1, period 1, your cost of producing units is 
lowered from $7.75 to $7.50 for period 1 and all the remaining periods (2–10) in block 1. 
Note that your profits may be influenced by having lower production costs. 
During each Innovation stage, you will be asked to select the number of innovation processes you wish to 
undertake in the current period. In the first period you may choose any number of processes between 0 and 30. 
While you can choose up to 30 processes, you may only receive one $0.25 cost reduction per period. 
Example: Say you attempt 11 processes. Suppose that the first 7 result in failure, but that the 8th 
process is a success (the number 10 is randomly selected). Then you will receive a cost reduction for the 
period. Because you can only have one cost reduction per period, the 9th, 10th and 11th processes are 
immaterial and will not be displayed. 
It is important to note that even if you choose a large number of processes, success is not guaranteed because 
each process is randomly and independently determined. 
The potential benefit of choosing at least one process is the chance of getting a cost reduction. However, 
innovation processes are not costless. Each process costs $0.10. So for every $0.10 you agree to spend, you 
have a 10 % chance of receiving a cost reduction of $0.25. 
Note that you and the other sellers in your market make independent process decisions in each Innovation 
stage. 
Example: Say you chose 6 processes and one of the other sellers chose 16. You spend $0.60 and the 
other seller spends $1.60, yet random chance may mean that you are successful and that the other 
seller is not because the computer picks different random outcomes for you both. 
After each Innovation stage, you will learn how much the other sellers in your market spent on innovation 
processes and they will learn how much you spent. You will also learn whether the other sellers were successful 
or not, and vice versa. 
Profit 
Your profit for a particular period is calculated as follows: 
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 =  (𝐘𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐏𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐞 −  𝐘𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐝𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭 𝐏𝐞𝐫 𝐔𝐧𝐢𝐭)  ∗  (𝐍𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐔𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐬 𝐒𝐨𝐥𝐝)  
−  (𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐬 𝐁𝐨𝐮𝐠𝐡𝐭) ∗  ($𝟎. 𝟏𝟎) 
Notice that your profit increases in your price and in the number of units you sell. Your profit also increases with 
decreases in your production cost. Finally, your profit decreases (by $0.10) with each innovation process you 
buy. 
The computer will calculate your profit for you. After each Market stage you will receive feedback about your 
profit. You will not receive information about the profit of the other sellers in your market, nor will they receive 
any feedback about your profit. 
At the end of each period your profit (calculated according to the above formula) is added to the profit you have 
previously earned. The result is referred to as your total profit. 
If your total profit dips below $0.00, the computer will not let you lose additional money. However, if you have 
$0.00 in total profit you will not be able to purchase any processes in the Innovation stage. 
After each block, your total profit will reset. However, you will be paid your earnings for all 3 blocks at the 
conclusion of the experiment! 
Additional Instructions 
Between blocks, your cost of producing units ‘‘resets’’ to $7.75 per unit. 
Example: Say you had four successes in block 1, so that your cost of producing units was $6.75. At the 
conclusion of block 1, period 10, but before the start of block 2, period 1, your cost of producing units 
will reset to $7.75. 
There are two types of blocks in this experiment: single blocks and multiple blocks. 
Buyers have the same buyer values regardless of block type and they will only ever buy at most one unit from 
each seller. 
In single blocks, each buyer demands one unit total; in multiple blocks, each buyer demands more than one unit 
total. 
Again, even in multiple blocks where buyers demand more than one unit total, they will only buy at most one 
unit from each seller. 
You will not be told whether you are playing in a single block or a multiple block. 
Prior to the start of each block, you will be given an endowment of $5.00. This endowment is provided to allow 
you to buy innovation processes in the first period of the block if you so choose. You are under no obligation to 
buy processes in the first nor in any subsequent period. Your profits may be influenced by having lower 
production costs. If you wish, you can go the entire experiment without buying an innovation process. If you do 
so, your endowments will be part of your earnings paid to you at the experiment’s conclusion. 
You will remain in the same market throughout the experiment. Thus, the other sellers in your market in block 1 
will be the other sellers in your market in subsequent blocks as well. 
Review 
In Innovation stages you choose a number of processes. Each process has a 1/10 or 10 % chance of success. 
Processes cost $0.10. Success means a $0.25 per unit cost reduction for the current and all future periods within 
a block. 
In Market stages you choose a price and a maximum quantity. Buyers will buy from you first if your price is less 
than the other seller’s prices. Whether your price is initially the lowest or not, it must be less than their buyer 
value for them to purchase. 
In single blocks, buyers only demand one unit total; in multiple blocks they demand more than one unit total. 
Regardless of block type, buyers buy at most one unit from each seller. You will not be told whether the block 
type is single or multiple. 
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Notes 
1 X-inefficiency is defined as the difference between actual and minimum cost of production for a given output 
(Leibenstein 1978). 
2 To the best of my knowledge. For surveys of the existing theoretical and (non-experimental) empirical 
literature, see Frantz (1988, 2007). 
3 The exchange rate between experimental and U.S. currency was $10.00 experimental dollars to US$1.00. 
4 If, over the course of several periods, a subject used his endowment on innovation and did not offset this 
expenditure with earnings from the Market stage, his cumulative profit fell. If a subject’s cumulative 
profit dipped below $3.00 during a block, the experimental software only let him purchase as many 
attempts as he had funds for. His cumulative profit could reach $0.00, but could not go negative. Across 
all treatments there were only six cases where a subject’s cumulative profit reached $0.00. In each, the 
subject in question subsequently earned profits in a Market stage and ended the block with a 
cumulative profit above $0.00. 
5 Subjects set their capacity to 8 units 77.5 % of the time, so while the Market stage was a price-capacity game, 
competition de facto focused on price. Subjects very rarely made capacity choices that, given their 
marginal cost and chosen price, restricted their sales (and thus their profit). Out of 2220 capacity choices 
in the data, 104 (4.7 %) were ‘‘mistakes’’ in this sense. 59.6 % of these mistakes occurred in either 
periods 1 or 2 of Block 1. In Blocks 2 and 3, subjects made capacity mistakes just 2.2 % of the time. 
6 As in naturally-occurring markets, sellers had incomplete information about demand. Though this added 
complexity to their decision task, optimal price was a discovery process for subjects in all treatments. 
7 An alternative motivation is the presence of a barrier to competitive entry (Monopoly), its removal (Oligopoly), 
and eventual reinstatement (Monopoly). 
8 There were two reasons for this differential feedback. First, subjects in the 𝑛 > 1 treatments were given more 
feedback in monopoly so that their feedback would be constant in both monopoly and oligopoly. 
Second, it was possible that with more feedback, imitation would induce subjects in the 𝑛 > 1 
treatments to attempt more innovation in Block 1 than did ONE subjects. Unreported regressions 
(available from the author) indicate that this did not occur: There was no significant difference in 
innovation expenditure across treatments. 
9 Though this feature of the design is perhaps unrealistic, subjects were in the dark about competition only 
during the Innovation stage of period 1. Thereafter they knew exactly how many competitors they 
faced. 
10 This is the standard measure with linear demand and constant marginal cost. For example, see Figure 1 in 
Comanor and Leibenstein (1969), Figure 13 in Frantz (1988), Figure 3.10 in Waldman and Jensen (2007), 
and Figure 2.9 in Martin (2010). See Parish and Ng (1972) for an alternative measure. 
11 Formally, for market structure 𝑗 ∈  {𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦;  𝑑𝑢𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦;  𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦} and a given block, average profit 
for cost level ?̅? is: 
 
𝜋𝑗(?̅?) =
∑  10𝑡=1 ∑  
𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1 𝟙{𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ?̅?}(𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡)𝑞𝑖𝑡
∑  
𝑁𝑗
𝑖=1 𝟙{𝑠𝑖𝑡 = ?̅?}
 
 
where 𝑖 indexes subjects in market structure 𝑗, 𝑁𝑗  is the number of subjects in market structure 𝑗 in the 
block, prices are denoted by 𝑝, sales by 𝑞, and 𝟙(⋅) is the indicator function. 
12 Unreported regressions (available from the author) indicate no significant differences across treatments in 
Block 1. In Block 3, price was initially lower in TWOREV and FOURREV than in ONE, because subjects in 
the former treatments were not sure if they were monopolists or oligopolists. They quickly figured out 
that they were monopolists and raised their prices. 
13 6 of the 77 average profit figures that were used to calculate these optimal paths were imputed from linear 
or polynomial regressions because a few cost levels were never reached in certain market structures. 
14 These results are subject to the caveat that independence across periods in the deviation paths is not strictly 
satisfied. 
15 Isaac and Reynolds (1992) also report under-investment in cost innovation in their similar environment. 
16 When x-inefficiency is calculated relative to the exogenous cost frontier (optimality is a cost reduction in each 
period), or relative to the subject with the lowest cost in each treatment (the ‘‘best practice firm’’), x-
inefficiency is significantly lower in oligopoly than monopoly in Block 3.  
17 For a notable critique of x-inefficiency theory, see Stigler (1976). 
 
